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I.

Introduction

Since their inception on September 16, 1938, the Federal
of
Civil Procedure have largely directed civil litigation
Rules
procedures in American trial courts, particularly in the federal
district courts. The organization of the rules chiefly reflects the
natural progression of a civil case from the filing of a claim to the
enforcement of a judgment. The rules have been periodically
updated to meet changing practices and expectations.' At the outset
and through the years, however, the rules have ignored certain party
and nonparty interests that are regularly considered during civil

cases.

* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby
College, 1970; J.D., University of Chicago, 1974.
** B.S., Marquette University 1995; J.D. expected, University of Illinois,
2002.
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have undergone revisions in 1941,
1948, 1949, 1951, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1975, 1980, 1983, 1985,
1987, 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999.
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The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have always been
tailored chiefly to trials and more recently to settlements of claims
between named parties. The rules focus on formal pleadings of
alleged breaches of substantive rights involving named parties. Yet
many civil cases also concern important party and nonparty interests
beyond those in the presented claims. Consider, for example,
personal injury cases wherein the true conflicts are often not over the
pleaded claims, but over related interests including attorney's
contingency fees; hospital, physician, worker's compensation or
other liens; subrogation; insurance coverage; indemnification; and
contribution. The absence of written rules governing party and
nonparty interests has led to unfortunate misunderstandings. Given
the continuing recognition and, in many instances, the expansion of
party and nonparty interests in personal injury and other civil cases,
it is time to rewrite the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other
American civil procedure laws to better reflect the way the civil
justice system truly operates.
This Article will demonstrate how American trial courts often
deal with party and nonparty interests that are outside pleaded claims
and are largely unrecognized in written civil procedure laws. The
Article illustrates using Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance
Company of America, a case in which the United States Supreme
Court set out guidelines for ancillary jurisdiction.
Both federal and state civil trial courts often employ ancillary
jurisdiction to address party and nonparty interests outside of
presented claims. 3 Ancillary jurisdiction can cover two forms of
interests: public interests such as citations for civil contempt and
sanctions for litigation misconduct, and private interests such as liens
and civil claim assignments. This Article will explore these private
interests.
Ancillary jurisdiction is relevant to both private party and
nonparty interests at many stages of civil litigation. This Article will
explore four stages: (1) the early search for subject matter
jurisdiction, (2) the presentation of claims for resolution, (3) the
pretrial conference, and (4) the enforcement of judgments. We hope
2. 511 U.S. 375 (1994).

3. For example, trial courts recognize that under certain circumstances they

may act to secure enforcement of a settlement between parties resolving all

presented claims and resolving disputes between prevailing plaintiffs and their

(non-party) lawyers over contingency fees due.
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this Article will demonstrate the need for written civil procedure
laws that better reflect the private interest resolutions occurring in
American civil trial courts.
In Kokkonen, the named parties entered into a settlement4
agreement to resolve a pending federal district court diversity case.
Upon settlement, the case was voluntarily dismissed by stipulation
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41.5 Kokkonen, an insurance
agent, allegedly breached the settlement agreement with the
defendant insurer by refusing to return certain documents. The
district court enforced these settlement terms. However, in a
unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court denied
enforcement because of a lack of federal court subject matter
jurisdiction.6 The Court said, "Neither the Rule nor any provision of
law provides for jurisdiction of the court over disputes arising out of
an agreement that produces the stipulation." 7 Finding that the
settlement agreement required its own basis for subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court found no independent basis for jurisdiction
under any statute.8 Further, the Court explained that ancillary
jurisdiction was possibly available but extended only to "permit
disposition.., of claims that are... factually interdependent" or "to
enable a court to function successfully." 9
In Kokkonen, the district court did not reserve jurisdiction in
order to act on any alleged future breaches of the settlement
agreement. 10 Although the court was aware of the settlement terms,
it did not even mention the agreement in its dismissal order. The
Supreme Court held that any breaches of the agreement were not
enforceable in the district court."
The Court found that the
insurance company simply sought enforcement of the underlying

4. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 376-77.
5. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) (providing in part that "an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court... (ii) by filing a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action").
6. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380-82 (refusing to extend ancillary jurisdiction to
cover enforcement of the settlement agreement).
7. Id. at 378.

8. See id. at 382.
9. Id. at 380; see also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,
377 (1978) (holding that ancillary jurisdiction is based on the practical need "to
protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit").
10. Id. at 380.
11. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at381.
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settlement pact rather than the reopening of the dismissed civil
action.12
The Supreme Court found this attempt at enforcement
impermissible.'x However, the Court's opinion did indicate that if
the settlement agreement had been integrated into the dismissal order
the district court could have enforced it because jurisdiction would
have been necessary "to effectuate" the court decree. 14 In addition to
effectuating court decrees, the Court noted that ancillary authority
may also be employed "to enable a court to function successfully" in
circumstances where the trial court needed to "manage its
proceedings" or to "vindicate its authority." 15 While attempts at
effectuation, management, and vindication were all missing in
Kokkonen, the Supreme Court suggested that these elements might
be present in other settings involving party and nonparty private

interests.16

This Article addresses questions arising from Kokkonen:
How might ancillary authority as defined in Kokkonen govern
private party and nonparty interests in subject matter jurisdiction,
claim presentation, pretrial conference, and judgment enforcement?
When ancillary jurisdiction encompasses private party and nonparty
interests beyond presented claims involving named parties, are the
necessary procedures set forth in written civil procedure laws? If
not, have difficulties resulted? How might any such difficulties be
addressed by new written civil procedure laws?
II.

Written Federal Civil Procedure Rules: Their Literal
Terms and Broader Applications
A.

Subject MatterJurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 states that the federal rules
govern procedures in the United States district courts "in all suits of
a civil nature." 17 Most civil suits are "commenced by filing a com12. Id. at 378.

13. Id. at 381 (holding that an agreement dismissing a federal suit does not

create federal jurisdiction over an action to enforce the agreement).
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id. at 380.
See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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plaint with the court." 18 Under Rule 8(a), a complaint usually
contains, at a minimum, allegations involving (1) the basis for
subject matter jurisdiction, (2) "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," and (3) "a
demand for judgment."1 9
The jurisdiction referred to in Rule 8(a)(1) is subject matter
jurisdiction. 2 0 Independent jurisdictional authority is chiefly set out
in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1364.21 Also, § 1367(a) further extends
jurisdiction by granting to the federal district courts "supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution." 22 This supplemental jurisdiction covers "claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties." 23 In this
setting, a claim is pleaded or otherwise presented as a cause of
action. In limiting the scope to presented claims, the supplemental
jurisdiction statute follows the Kokkonen Court's recognition of
federal district court authority over "factually interdependent" claims
but not its recognition of federal district court authority over matters
necessary for the court to function successfully. 24 The statute thus
ignores many party and nonparty interests that are subject to
ancillary jurisdiction under Kokkonen.
In Kalyawongsa v. Moffet? 5 a federal district court used
nonstatutory ancillary jurisdiction to resolve a dispute about liens
asserted by several lawyers on settlement proceeds arising from a
housing discrimination claim.2 6 The defendant allegedly refused to
sell a tract of land to the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were an
interracial couple.27 The case remained unsettled for several years
and the plaintiffs replaced their counsel several times. When the
case finally settled, two of the plaintiffs' former lawyers pursued
18. FED. R. CIv. P. 3.
19. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
20. See FED. R. CIv. P. App. Form 2.

21. See generally 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1364 (West 1993) (describing the va-

riety of cases in which federal courts have independent federal jurisdiction).
22. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West 1993).
23. Id.

24. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80

(1994).

25. 105 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 1997).
26. Id. at 287-88.
27. Id. at 285.
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liens against the settlement proceeds. The district court awarded fees
to the lawyers in accordance with the retainer agreements the
plaintiffs had signed.
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that the trial court had
improperly exercised jurisdiction, and, even if the trial court did have
the power to declare a lien, the court must leave enforcement to an
independent civil action. 28 The court of appeals disagreed, deeming
it a well-established principle that attorney's fees fell within the trial
court's ancillary jurisdiction, which permits "courts to adjudicate
matters that arise during the course of an action and affect the court's
ability either to render an efficacious judgment or to control the
litigation before it." 29 Regarding the trial court's power to enforce
liens, the appellate court held that the "same considerations that
support supplemental jurisdiction also support some resolution, in
the same
court, of the attorneys' rights and the extent of their
30
claim."
The court also said that "[r]esolution of related fee disputes is
often required to provide a full and fair resolution of the litigation,"
which enables the court "to render complete justice." 31 In so ruling,
the appellate court remarked that lawyers were officers of the court
and their "fees are part of the overall costs of the underlying
33
litigation," 32 making the fees "related to the main civil action."
Additionally, the court noted that "[c]onsiderations of judicial
judge "is akeady familiar with
economy are at stake" since the trial,,4
The Kalyawongsa decision
the relevant facts and legal issues.
demonstrates that some courts have employed nonstatutory ancillary
jurisdiction to resolve both party and nonparty interests.
B.

PresentingClaims

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) allows the party filing
the original complaint to join additional claims. 35 It states that a
28. Id. at 288.
29. Id. at 287 (citing Curry v. De Priore, 941 F.2d 730, 731 (9th Cir. 1991)).
30. Id. at 288.

31. Kalyawongsa, 105 F.3d at 287 (citing Jenkins v. Weinshienk, 670 F.2d

915, 918 (10th Cir. 1982)).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 288.
34. Id. at287.
35. See FED. R CIV. P. 18(a).
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claimant "may joi...
as many claims... as the party has against
an opposing party." 36 Rule 18 also permits a party to assert a claim
that was "heretofore cognizable only after another claim has been
prosecuted to a conclusion." 37 It further states that a court "shall
grant relief.., 38only in accordance with the relative substantive rights
of the parties."
In addition, under the federal civil procedure rules an original
plaintiff may join with one or more other plaintiffs or may join two
or more defendants in the suit.3 9 Pursuant to Rule 20(a), "all persons
may join in one action as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief
jointly, severally, or in the alternative."40 However, joinder is
limited to those asserting rights to relief arising from "the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and
if any question41of law or fact common to all these persons will arise
in the action."
Further, an original defendant may act as a third-party
plaintiff by adding a party to the civil action through Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 14(a).42 This allows the defendant to implead a
third-party defendant if the individual "is or may be liable to the
third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff s claim against the
third-party plaintiff."4 3
Similarly, a federal district court can sua sponte compel
joinder of a person "as a party in the action" under Rule 19 ifjoinder
will not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. 44 The Rules
permit this type of joinder as long as the person "claims an interest
relating to" the case and the person's absence will either damage his
ability to protect that interest or the failure to join will expose
existing parties to substantial risk of "double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest." 45 If such
a person cannot feasibly be joined in the action as a party, the trial
court must determine if the person is "indispensable" by considering

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 18(b).
Id.
See FED. R. Crv. P. 20.
FED. R. CIv. P. 20(a).
Id.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a).

43. Id.

44. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
45. Id.
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a number of factors. 46 Those factors include the extent to which a
judgment in the person's absence would be prejudicial to the person
or the parties, whether that prejudice can be mitigated through a
careful crafting of the judgment, whether any resulting judgment will
be adequate, and whether any original plaintiff will have another
47
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder.
Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) provides for
intervention "when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action" and the
48
applicant may not be able otherwise to fully protect that interest.
Rule 24(b) allows for permissive intervention "when an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact
in common. ' 49 Rule 24(c) outlines intervention procedures, which
require any proposed intervenor to file a motion "accompanied by a
pleading °setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is
5
sought.
These rules permit rather liberal joinder of both claims and
parties through the use of written pleadings. Yet in the absence of
written pleadings, certain claims may still be presented in the federal
district courts. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) declares that
for other than defaults, "every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the
5
party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings." '
Claims may also be resolved, although not within any written
pleadings, when "tried by express or implied consent of the parties"
under Rule 15(b).52 For example, an unpleaded claim is presented
for resolution when it is included in a pretrial conference
order which
53
action.
civil
the
of
course
subsequent
controls the
These rules governing the joinder of claims and parties fail to
acknowledge the many occasions in which nonparty interests are
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b).
47. See id.
48. FED. R. Cv. P. 24(a).
49. FED. R. COv. P. 24(b).
50. FED. R. Cv. P. 24(c).
51. FED. R. Cv. P. 54(c) (emphasis added).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b) ("When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as
if they had been raised in the pleadings.").
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(e) (stating that the pretrial order "shall not control
the subsequent course of the action unless modified by a subsequent order").
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presented and resolved. For example, note the absence of any
language covering the lawyer-lienholders in Kalyawongsa.54 A very
different occasion involving nonparty interests arose in San Jose
Mercury News v. U.S. District Court.55 A federal appeals court
approved a newspaper's petition to intervene permissively in a
sexual harassment suit so the newspaper could obtain access to an
investigative report that had been sealed as a part of a settlement
between the named parties.5 6 The pleading that must have
accompanied the newspaper's petition for intervention under Rule
24(c) could not have been one including named parties and pleaded
claims. It did not contain a claim against either the defendant or the
plaintiff; rather, it was a request for the release of civil litigation
documents. 57 The newspaper had no interest in the outcome of the
case on the merits and could complain of no injury as a result of any
sexual harassment. 58 The newspaper's only interest was in obtaining
documents in order to write a story.
Similar issues are present in civil actions involving
lienholders other than attorneys. Thus, hospitals, doctors, and others
are allowed to insert themselves into civil cases even though they
have presented no claims involving the two named parties and have
no "factually interdependent" claims. In fact, lienholders may have
no "claims" at all under the federal rules, since no breach of duty
may yet have occurred at the time certain liens attach. Lienholders
may have only financial interests in the outcomes of pending civil
cases. In sum, lienholders can utilize ancillary jurisdiction to secure
of their private interests though they have presented no
resolution
59
claims.
C.

PretrialConferences

Pretrial conferences may be held under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16 for various purposes, including "facilitating the
settlement of the case ' 60 and "improving the quality of the trial
54. See generally Kalawongsa v. Moffett, 105 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 1997).
55. 187 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999).

56. See id. at 1098.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 1099.
59. See, e.g., Temesvary v. Houdek, 703 N.E.2d 613 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(holding that a trial court may determine reasonableness of a physician's charges
before adjudication of a lien under the Physicians Lien Act).
60. FED. R. CIv. P. 16(a)(5).
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through more thorough preparation." 61 While both settlement and
trial-preparation conferences can involve significant party and
nonparty interests outside of 62any claims already presented, this
federal rule suggests otherwise.
1.

Settlement Conferences

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(a)(5) grants federal
district judges the power to direct the parties' attorneys to appear for
the purpose of "facilitating the settlement of the case." 63 Such a
settlement conference expressly encompasses only presented claims.
Rule 16(c)(9) states that subjects for consideration at a pretrial
conference can include "settlement and the use of special procedures
to assist in resolving the dispute." 64 In addition, Rule 16(c) currently
allows judges to "require that a party or its representative be present
or reasonably available by
telephone in order to consider possible
' 65
settlement of the dispute."
The case of G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat
66
Corp., decided under an earlier version of Rule 16, demonstiates
the limitations inherent in the wording of that rule. 67 The trial court
ordered the defendant corporation to produce a corporate
68
representative with settlement authority at a settlement conference.
Although the company sent two attorneys to the conference, it sent
no corporate representative. The trial court sanctioned the corporate
defendant for noncompliance. The defendant appealed, arguing that
Rule 16 at the time only expressly allowed trial courts to order
attorneys to attend conferences.
The court of appeals, while acknowledging that the existing
rule did not specifically permit a court to compel the attendance of
parties, found that the federal civil procedure rules did not
61. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a)(4).
62. See FED. R. Cv. P. 16(a) (recognizing that only "attorneys for the parties
and any unrepresented parties" may be directed to appear at pretrial conferences).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9).
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).

66. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
67. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (effective in 1993) ("If appropriate, the court
may require that a party or its representative be present or reasonably available by
telephone in order to consider possible settlement of the dispute.").
68. Heileman Brewing, 871 F.2d at 650.
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"completely describe and limit the power of the federal courts." 69
Thus, absence of language in the rules expressly authorizing certain
trial court conduct did not mean that the conduct could not be
undertaken. 70 In fact, the appeals court held that the "inherent
power" of the trial court could be used to ensure the "orderly and
71
expeditious disposition of cases" by compelling party attendance.
Seemingly, this power was also recognized in Kokkonen when the
could
Supreme Court explained that trial court ancillary jurisdiction
72
successfully."
function
to
court
a
be exercised "to enable
2.

Trial Preparation Conferences

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(1) grants federal
district judges the power to direct attendance at pretrial conferences
for "the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the
elimination of frivolous claims or defenses. ' 73 This rule suggests
that issues germane to trial preparation conferences relate to
presented claims or defenses. Rule 16(c)(2) lends support by adding
that "the necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings"
may be considered at these conferences. 74 Additional matters for
consideration under Rule 16(c)(13) include "an order for a separate
trial pursuant to Rule 42(b) with respect to a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third-party claim, or with respect to any particular
issue in the case. ' 75 Rule 42(b) allows the trial court to "order a
separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party
claim, or any separate issue" when separation will prevent prejudice
or will prove expedient.76 Thus, trial preparation conferences seem
geared toward upcoming trials involving pleaded claims between
named parties.
It is common practice, however, for federal district courts to
determine at trial party and nonparty interests beyond any presented
69. Id. at 651.

70. See id. at 651 (indicating that a district court's exercise of procedural authority outside the language of the rules was valid though "not frequently
documented").

71. Id. The court noted that this "inherent power" is grounded in the control

vested in a court to manage its cases in an organized and expeditious manner. Id.

72. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of An., 511 U.S. 375, 380 (1994).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).

74. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(2).
75. FED. R. Crv. P. 16(c)(13).
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
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claims. In Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPCAcquisition Co., Inc.,7 7 for

example, CPC employed a law firm to assist in its contemplated
takeover of Cluett.78 Cluett thereafter filed an action in a federal
district court to enjoin CPC from certain takeover acts. During the
litigation, Cluett was voluntarily acquired by another company and
the civil action was mooted. Shortly thereafter, CPC disagreed with
its lawyers about legal fees related to the attempted takeover and
filed a declaratory judgment action in a state court. Since the Cluett
federal court action was still awaiting final disposition, the law firm
asked the trial judge in that case to exercise ancillary jurisdiction
over the fee dispute. The district court assented and held a jury trial.
After a jury finding for the law firm, CPC appealed. It
argued that the federal district court did not have ancillary
jurisdiction over the fee dispute. The court of appeals, however,
noted that it is "well settled that '[a] federal court may, in its
discretion, exercise ancillary jurisdiction to hear fee disputes . . .
between litigants and their attorneys when the disputes relate to the
main action.' 79 The district court's holding was affirmed even
though a portion of the disputed fees involved work on8 0the attempted
takeover that was unconnected to the federal litigation.
Given that trials, as in Cluett, can extend beyond matters
encompassing pleaded claims between parties, trial preparation
conference rules such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 should
reflect that additional matters are suitable for conferencing.
D.

Judgments

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the entry of a
judgment signifies the resolution of at least one claim involving at
least two named parties. 8 1 In multi-claim and multi-party settings,
the Rules favor a single judgment covering all pending claims. Rule
77. 863 F.2d 251 (2dCir. 1988).
78. Id. at 252.
79. Id. at 256 (quoting Marrero v. Christiano, 575 F. Supp. 837, 839
(S.D.N.Y. 1983)).

80. See id. at 257 ("It would have been wasteful and duplicative, under the

circumstances, to require a bifurcated procedure in which part of the fee dispute
would be resolved by a federal court in Manhattan and another part by a state court
in Sacramento, California.").
81. See generally FED. R.Civ. P. 54-63 (explaining the federal procedural
requirements pertaining to judgments).
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54(b) states that in the absence of an express determination and
direction
any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
claims or rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form or
decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the
82
rights and liabilities of all the parties.
These provisions fail to acknowledge expressly that
attorneys, hospitals, insurers, and other interested nonparties often
have as much to gain or lose through final judgments as do the
named parties. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71 does
state that when "an order is made in favor of a person who is not a
party... that person may enforce obedience.., by the same process
as if a party."' 3 Further, in saying that "when obedience to an order
may be lawfully enforced against a person who is not a party, that
person is liable to the same process for enforcing obedience to the
order as if a party."' 84 Seemingly, this rule encompasses the type of
injunctive relief ordered against nonparties that is expressly
permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.85 Rule 71 may
also contemplate monetary awards to lienholders or court-imposed
financial obligations on defendant's nonparty insurers. 86 At best, the
recognition of nonparty interests in final judgements is oblique so
that a clear understanding of the reach of the federal civil procedure
rules is not facilitated.
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Epstein87 is an
example of a trial court judgment involving party interests other than
pleaded claims. Matsushita had made a successful tender offer for
the common stock of MCA, Inc. 88 MCA's shareholders filed a class
82. FED. R. COv. P. 54(b).
83. FED. R. CIv. P. 71.

84. Id.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) (stating that injunctions and restraining orders may
be binding not only upon the parties, but also "upon those persons in active concert
or participation with them who receive actual notice").
86. See FED. R. C1v. P. 71.

87. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
88. Id. at 367.
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action lawsuit against MCA, its directors, and Matsushita in a
Delaware state court for breach of their fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder value. Subsequently, some shareholders filed another
suit against Matsushita in a federal district court for violation of
federal Securities and Exchange Commission rules. This federal suit
was dismissed and while it was on appeal the parties to the state
lawsuit settled. 89 The shareholders in the state suit agreed to a
release with prejudice of all claims, including the claims presented in
the federal action. 90 The terms of agreement were incorporated into
the state court's91final judgment which barred further litigation of the
federal lawsuit.
However, several stockholders later urged that the settlement
agreement encompassed claims within the exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary and that these claims were not
barred but should continue in the federal courts. The Supreme Court
held that although some of the claims settled in the state suit were
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, the state courts
could enforce settlements of those claims as long as the state courts
rendered no decisions on the merits of the claims. 92 While the
parties could not press certain federal law claims in the state court,
the state court could hold a hearing to determine that the settlements
of those very same claims were in the best interests of the class
93
members and could agree to enforce any resulting settlements.
Matsushita demonstrates how trial courts are able to enforce
judgments involving party interests that were not-and 94could not
have been-pleaded as claims for resolution on the merits.
89. See id at 369-70.
90. See id. at 370-71.
91. See id. at 369-70.
92. Matsushita,516 U.S. at 386-87.
93. Id. 381-82 (finding that the state court's approval of the settlement "does
not amount to judgment on the merits of the [federal] claims").
94. Federal appellate courts have also recognized that federal district courts
have supplemental jurisdiction in disputes between a party and a nonparty which
involve the nonparty's indemnification of the party for a money judgment against
the party. These courts have recognized such jurisdiction when the dispute arises
during post-judgment asset discovery proceedings initiated by the judgment

creditor under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a). See Carver v. Condie, 169

F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that it is within ancillary court authority to

enforce the judgment in a dispute involving an Illinois county's duty to satisfy a
sheriff-signed consent); see also Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1996)
(recognizing ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of supplementary
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Misunderstandings of Ancillary Jurisdiction Due to the
Limitations of Written Civil Procedure Laws

Ancillary jurisdiction appears to extend beyond factually
interdependent claims, embodies power over more than pleaded
claims, and prompts pretrial conferences directed at private party and
nonparty interests beyond claims pleaded for resolution on the
merits. It also appears to cover judgment enforcement involving
settlements of claims which could not have been presented for
resolution.
Yet, because the broad parameters of ancillary
jurisdiction over private party and nonparty interests are
unrecognized in written civil procedure laws, courts and litigants are
often prone to misunderstandings. At times these written laws have
also been curiously stretched
to reach a desired result, resulting in
95
Novak.
re
In
like
decisions
In Novak, a legal malpractice case, a federal district judge
ordered an employee of the defendant's insurer to attend "a pretrial
conference to facilitate settlement discussions." 96 The appellate
court found that the trial judge lacked the authority to issue the order
under the existing civil procedure rule but suggested an alternate way
to secure the appearance. 97 In doing so the court not only strained to
apply the relevant civil procedure rule but also appeared to
misunderstand the full breadth of trial court ancillary jurisdiction.
The relevant rule governing pretrial conferences stated that a
district court "may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties
and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference...98
for such purposes as ... facilitating the settlement of the case."
The appellate court held that this rule, as written, did not cover
directives to the insurer's employee since he was neither an attorney

proceedings involving nonparties, including attachment mandamus, and
garnishment); Macklanburg-Duncan Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 71

F.3d 1526, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995) (allowing ancillary trial court authority during
post-judgment proceedings to resolve insurance dispute between a judgment debtor
and nonparty insurer when the relevant facts and theories are very similar to those
germane to the claim leading to the judgment).
95. 932 F.2d 1397 (1lth Cir. 1991).
96. Id. at 1398.
97. See id. at 1406-07.
98. Id. at 1404 (citing FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a) (1983)).
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nor an unrepresented party.99 The court also found that the directive
100
was not authorized by either a statute or inherent court power.
Notwithstanding the rule's explicit provisions that cover only
attorneys and unrepresented parties, the appellate court found that
trial-court directives requiring appearances of represented parties at
pretrial settlement conferences were permitted under the inherent
powers doctrine, at least when the parties' attorneys had not been
delegated full settlement authority.10 ' Such a directive could be an
alternate way of seeking the presence of an insurer's employee. The
appellate court suggested that the district court could have secured
the attendance of the nonparty insurance agent by directing the
insured defendant, a named party, to produce an individual with full
settlement authority at the pretrial conference. 10 2 The appellate court
also hinted that such an order directed at the defendant (rather than at
the defendant's insurer) may even have been expressly authorized by
the pretrial conference rule, reasoning "there is a colorable argument
that Rule 16 empowers the court to order such a party to attend a
pretrial conference; the party is an unrepresented party with respect
to settlement, and, thus his attendance is crucial. ' 'I °3 This constitutes
a strained reading of Rule 16 since it requires courts to consider
whether a party with an attorney is "unrepresented" based on the
degree of authority delegated to the attorney by the party,10 4which
requires courts to delve into attorney-client communications.
The appellate court's general interpretation of inherent trial
court power in Novak was comparable to the vision of ancillary
jurisdiction in Kokkonen. In Novak, inherent power was appropriate
when the court deemed the exercise of power "necessary to protect
its ability to function [or] . . . to facilitate activity authorized by
99. Id. at 1408.
100. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1409.
101. See id. at 1406-07 (rejecting the argument that, by explicitly mentioning
only unrepresented parties and parties' attorneys, Rule 16 prohibits district courts
from issuing pretrial orders directed at represented parties).
102. See id. at 1408 (stating that the defendant's nonparty insurer who
possesses settlement authority could be coerced into attending if, for example, the
trial judge issued an order directing attendance of someone with full settlement
authority and threatened to strike the defendant's pleadings as a sanction for
noncompliance).
103. Id. at 1407 n.19.
104. See id. (holding that an otherwise-represented party who retains full
settlement authority may be "an unrepresented party with respect to settlement").
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statute or rule"'10 5 In Kokkonen, ancillary jurisdiction was held to be
appropriate when the trial court deemed it necessary "to function
successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings." ' 6 Yet, in Novak
the court limited the scope of inherent power to include only trial
court orders directed at attorneys or parties.10 7 The court's holding
in Novak excluded orders directed at nonparties even when they were
nonparties only in a formal sense because they controlled the
litigation for the named parties and had real interests at stake. 10 8 The
Novak court acknowledged that this limitation at times "may impede
a district court's ability to conduct a fruitful settlement
conference" when a nonparty, not itself subject to inherent power
directives, is also not subject to coercion through the named parties
or their attorneys. 10 9 The court acknowledged that this limit would
surface when a nonparty insurer and an insured party have
"conflicting interests."'l1
Can a trial court resolve conflicting interests between a
nonparty insurer and an insured defendant in a civil action? If so,
can the two be directed to attend a pretrial conference? The answer
appears to be yes, notwithstanding the Novak court's analysis. In
Cluett, a fee dispute between the nonparty attorney and a named
party was resolved."' How different is a coverage dispute between a
nonparty insurer and an insured defendant? In Kokkonen, the court
suggested that ancillary jurisdiction is proper over unpresented
claims that involve many of the same facts as the pleaded claims
when the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction is essential to enable a
court to function successfully. 112 The Novak court did not fully
extend the inherent power doctrine to the limits of ancillary
105. Novak, 932 F.2d at 1406.
106. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 379-80
(1994).
107. See Novak, 932 F.2d at 1408.
108. See id. (stating that, although an insurer controls the litigation for its insured and is effectively a party to the action, Rule 16 does not allow courts to order
insurers that are not formally parties to the case to provide an individual with full
settlement authority at the pretrial conference).

109. Id.
110. Id. at 1408 n.20 ("[W]hen the insurer's and the insured's interests are not

aligned, they generally hire their own attorneys to protect their conflicting

interests.").
111. See Cluett, Peabody & Co. v. CPC Acquisition Co., Inc., 863 F.2d 251

(2d Cir. 1988).
112. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 380-81
(1994).
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jurisdiction later defined in Kokkonen but instead was deterred by the
formality of the pretrial conference rule's explicit embrace of only
attorneys and parties, even though the conduct of fruitful settlement
conferences would be impeded. 1 3
IV.

Written Civil Procedure Laws That Better Recognize
Party and Nonparty Interests in Civil Litigation

Misunderstandings of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine and
its relevance to such civil procedure arenas as subject matter
jurisdiction, interest presentations, pretrial conferences and judgment
enforcement should be diminished. In order to accomplish this,
more comprehensive written civil procedure laws are needed. This
section of the Article outlines how new written civil procedure laws

might look.

Better recognition of trial court subject matter jurisdiction
over party and nonparty interests beyond presented claims could be
accomplished through amendments to the federal civil procedure
rules. A new rule should be adopted that requires allegations as to
ancillary subject matter jurisdiction over any party or nonparty
interests presented for resolution on the merits and over judicial
enforcement of settlements. Amendments could be modeled on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1).
Similarly, greater clarity would be promoted by amendments
to the supplementary jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.114
Successful functioning of a federal court necessitates judicial power
to "manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees."' 115 The statute should address judicial authority over not
only factually interdependent claims but also orders intended to
enable courts "to function successfully."'1 16 Statutory amendments
could facilitate these orders by explicitly granting ancillary court
authority to sanction civil litigation misconduct, to maintain
decorum, and to resolve the interests of certain nonparty lienholders,

113. See Novak, 932 F.2d at 1408.

114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (setting forth the rules for supplementary
jurisdiction).
115. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 380.

116. Id.
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insurers, and others.1 17 These orders enabling courts to function
successfully should also be recognized as subject to trial court
discretion, with the relevant factors to be considered by judges
enumerated." 8
Party and nonparty interests subject to this ancillary
jurisdiction would also be better recognized early in civil litigation if
greater notice responsibilities were added to written civil procedure
laws. Consider the local civil procedure rules of a Texas federal
119
district court, which require disclosure of all interested parties.
These rules make both the plaintiff and defendant responsible for
presenting, outside of the pleadings, "a separately signed certificate
of interested persons that contains a complete list of all persons,
associations of persons, firms, partnerships, corporations, guarantors,
insurers, affiliates, parent or subsidiary corporations, or other legal
entities who are or which are financially interested in the outcome of
the case." 120 A parallel federal rule providing early notice and the
117. See id. The Kokkoken court supported its holding that ancillary
jurisdiction can be used to enable a court to function successfully by citing
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), U.S. v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812),
and WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3523

(1984). Chambers authorizes courts to compel payment of an opposing party's
attorney's fees and to sanction for misconduct. 501 U.S. at 43-44. Hudson
authorizes courts to maintain order through the use of contempt. 11 U.S. at 34.
Wright, Miller & Cooper states that ancillary jurisdiction covers matters involving
attorneys' fees. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER § 3523.

118. See, e.g., Ryther v. Kare, 976 F. Supp. 853 (D. Minn. 1997) (citing Wing
v. E. River Chinese Rest., 884 F. Supp. 663 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)). The Ryther court
advocated that the following factors should be weighed by a trial court in deciding
whether to exercise jurisdiction over fee disputes: (1) the court's familiarity with
the subject matter of the suit, (2) the court's responsibility to protect its officers,
and (3) whether the convenience of the parties would be served. Id. at 858. The
court also cited 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) for the proposition that if a trial court believes
that a claim grounded in state law substantially dominates the federal question in
the claim there is a compelling reason for the federal court to decline jurisdiction.
Id. at 857.
119. D. TEX., N.D. TEX R 3.1(f) [hereinafter Texas Local Rule 3.1(f)]
(requiring that when a complaint is filed the plaintiff must also provide the court
clerk with a separately signed certificate of interested persons, including all legal
entities that are financially interested in the outcome of the case); see also D.
TEX., N.D. TEX. R 7.4 (requiring a defendant in a civil action to file a separately
signed certificate of interested persons or legal entities along with the initial
responsive pleading).
120. See Texas Local Rule 3.1(f), supra note 119 If a large group of persons
or firms can be specified by a generic description, individual listing is not
necessary.
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opportunity for interested persons and entities to participate would
diminish the need for concurrent or subsequent independent civil
actions.
The opportunity for pretrial conference agendas to include
settlement discussions related to party and nonparty interests within
ancillary court authority would be facilitated if the written laws
about these conferences included broader recognition of all potential
necessary participants. For example, the Massachusetts Court of
Appeals has extended its law beyond the scope of Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 16. Civil trial conferences in the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals must be attended by attorneys, parties, or "any
other person necessary to act on behalf of [the] respective parties"
when the attendance of the person is "the responsibility" of the
attorney. 121 Similarly, written civil procedure laws should expressly
recognize an opportunity for pretrial conference agendas to include
trial preparation discussions involving party and nonparty interests
that may be resolved under ancillary jurisdiction.
Finally, better recognition is needed of trial court ancillary
jurisdiction over enforcement of civil judgments involving resolution
of party and nonparty interests beyond the claims pleaded. Under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a final decision allowing the
recovery of a sum certain only prompts the clerk to enter a judgment
without waiting for court direction when the recovery is obtained by
a party. 122 Better recognition of ancillary jurisdiction would be
promoted by a written civil procedure rule that explicitly recognizes
that both a final judicial decision on the merits and a settlement
agreement can encompass the resolution of nonparty interests. This
would fit within the judicial powers noted in Kalyawongsa.

121. Standing Order of the Appeals Court of Massachusetts Concerning

Conferences in Civil Appeals, §(c)(2) (as amended Dec. 2, 1999) (requiring that all
attorneys and parties attend the civil trial conference unless excused by the
conference counsel and that the attorneys arrange the attendance of any other
person necessary to act on behalf of their respective parties).
122. See FED. R. Civ. P. 58 (explaining that "upon a general verdict of a jury,
or upon a decision by the court," a party shall receive only a sum certain, and the
clerk has the authority to prepare, sign, and enter a judgment without any direction
from the court); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 70 (explicitly stating that a judgment for a
specific act embodies only a directive to a party or an order on behalf of a "party
entitled to performance").
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Conclusion

Written civil procedure laws should better recognize the
significant ancillary authority of civil trial courts over party and
nonparty interests that extend beyond pleaded claims. This authority
enables trial judges to resolve disputes involving these interests and
to enforce settlements of judgments encompassing these interests.
This authority is frequently misunderstood. Misunderstandings
involving this ancillary authority would likely be reduced through
amendments to written civil procedure laws on supplementary
jurisdiction, claim and interest presentation, pretrial conferences, and
entry of judgments. These amendments need not alter existing
practices but only recognize them expressly so that ancillary
authority can be more easily understood and more fully and openly
exercised.

